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COHABITATION, FORNICATION AND THE FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION: LANDLORDS SEEKING
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FROM FAIR HOUSING LAWS
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that two individuals contact a landlord and tell her
they are seeking rental housing. Upon learning that the couple is
not married, the landlord refuses to rent an apartment to them,
indicating that cohabitation is against her religion. The state fair
housing law prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of
marital status, so the landlord is sanctioned for her illegal discrimi-
nation against the couple. As a defense, the landlord seeks a con-
stitutionally compelled exemption from the fair housing statute,
asserting that it violates her right to the free exercise of her reli-
gious beliefs. Does the Constitution, or a federal statute, require
that she be exempted from the fair housing law?'
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires
that "Congress shall make no law .. .prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]." 2 When an individual makes a claim under the Free
Exercise Clause, she is not claiming that a neutral, generally appli-
cable law is unconstitutional, but that it is unconstitutional as ap-
plied to her because it unduly burdens her free exercise of reli-
1. Yes, according to some recent cases. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted and opinion super-
seded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Mass.
1994) (remanding case to allow state to show a compelling interest, but indicating that it
would likely grant free exercise exemption); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2,
10-11 (Minn. 1990) (holding that while state fair housing statute did not protect unmarried
couples, it would grant religious exemption to a landlord if presented with the issue).
However, the Supreme courts of Alaska and California have both reached the oppo-
site conclusion, holding that the landlord was not entitled to a religious exemption. See
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912
(Cal. 1996).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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gion.3 Thus, the claimant is asking for a constitutionally compelled
exemption from the neutral, generally applicable statute.4 In the
case of a generally applicable fair housing statute, this would mean
that the landlord would be exempt from the requirements of the
law because it unconstitutionally burdens her free exercise of reli-
gion. Therefore, the result of granting a religious exemption would
be to allow the landlord to discriminate against the tenants on the
basis of their marital status, an otherwise illegal act. What makes
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance
law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensation law). These
challenged statutes were neutral and did not facially implicate religious exercise.
4. For a debate over whether the Framers of the Constitution intended to allow for
religious exemptions to neutral, generally applicable laws, compare Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409 (1990), which asserts that a religious-based constitutional exemption was con-
templated by the Framers, with Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916-17 (1992), which
asserts that the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause was merely to protect the exercise of
religion, and not to provide a constitutional right of exemption from civil laws. Hamburg-
er asserts that in the late eighteenth-century, Americans "increasingly said that they fa-
vored the free exercise of religion, and they clearly did not understand that right to in-
clude a right of exemption." Id. at 948. Moreover, even the politically active "expressly
disavowed such a right [of exemption] and frequently agitated for equal civil rights and
an absence of laws respecting religion." Id.
Some scholars have ardently defended the constitutionally compelled exemption, argu-
ing that free exercise is not sufficiently protected under current standards. See, e.g., James
D. Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas
Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
883 (1994); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter, McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism].
Others have questioned the doctrine of free exercise exemptions from neutral laws.
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357 (1990) (arguing that constitutionally
compelled exemptions prefer religion over secular interests). Criticisms of free exercise
exemptions include concerns that exemptions may conflict with the Establishment Clause.
See Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitu-
tion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739 (1986) (examining the tension between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause); David A. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affir-
mative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 83-87 (1991) (making a similar analysis of the two
clauses). But see Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 1, 33 (1989) (asserting that the two
clauses are not in tension, but instead create "a free market in religion" if applied cor-
rectly). Criticisms also include concerns that exemptions create a preference for religion
over non-religion, see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revi-
sionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 319-23 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, In Defense of
Smith], or for one religion over another. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Free Exercise
Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments; Constitutionally
Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 987
(1986).
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this issue so interesting is that it positions the state's interest in
civil rights against a free exercise claim.'
Courts addressing free exercise claims apply the "compelling
interest" test, which originated in Sherbert v. Verner6 and Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder.7 In Sherbert, the Court held that in addressing a free
exercise claim, it must first determine whether a secular law im-
poses an unconstitutional burden on the claimant's free exercise of
religion.' Next, it must consider whether this burden is justified by
a compelling state interest.9 Finally, it must determine whether
there is any less restrictive way to enforce the governmental inter-
est without burdening the claimant's free exercise of religion."0
This test was recently codified in the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 (RFRA)."
This Note will focus on the application of the RFRA to cases
where a landlord seeks a religious exemption from housing statutes
protecting unmarried couples. Part I will examine the compelling
interest test codified by RFRA, and its likely application in free
exercise cases. Next, Part II will examine the reasoning of the
cases that address the issue of religious exemptions for landlords
from fair housing statutes, focusing on Donahue v. Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Commission" and Swanner v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Commission'3 as examples of recent cases that come to the
opposite conclusion. Part I will analyze these decisions under the
compelling interest test codified in RFRA, concluding in Part IV
5. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1, 44 (D.C. 1987) (Pryor, J. concurring) ("By contrast, what is particularly compel-
ling about the governmental interest asserted in this case is that it directly pits the civil
rights of others against the claims of the religious objector."); see also Shelley K.
Wessels, Note, The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination
Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202-03 (1989) ("[P]recisely when the nondiscrimination
principle should trump the principle of religious freedom is not always clear .... ").
6. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that a Seventh-Day Adventist should be exempt
from a state unemployment compensation requirement that she accept work on Saturday,
her sabbath, if available).
7. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the claimants were exempt from a compul-
sory school attendance law because attendance at high school would be contrary to their
Amish religion).
8. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
9. Id.
10. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
12. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted and opinion superseded,
825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992).
13. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
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that landlords should not be granted religious exemptions from fair
housing laws in order to discriminate against unmarried couples.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
In 1993, Congress codified the compelling interest test for free
exercise challenges in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). 4 Specifically, the test in RFRA requires the government
to demonstrate a compelling interest, applied with the least restric-
tive means, in order to justify a substantial burden on an
individual's free exercise of religion. The statute states,
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a
person's free exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest. 5
The asserted purpose of RFRA is "to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substan-
tially burdened. ' 16 The question remains, however, how courts will
apply this compelling interest test. 7
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
17. Additionally, the constitutionality of RFRA is questionable. See, e.g., Canedy v.
Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The constitutionality of
[RFRA]-surely not before us here-raises a number of questions involving the extent of
Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). See generally Scott
C. Idelman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative
Power, 73 TaX. L. REV. 247 (1994). However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held that Congress did have the constitutional authority to enact RFRA. Flores v. City of
Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996).
Congress's asserted power for passage of RFRA is section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Marbury v. Mad-
1074 [Vol. 46:1071
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Just prior to the passage of RFRA, in 1990, the Supreme Court
seriously altered the compelling interest test for free exercise
claims in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith." In Smith, two members of the Native American Church
were fired from a private drug rehabilitation organization for sacra-
mental peyote use.'9 After being denied unemployment compensa-
tion due to their peyote use, the two claimed they were entitled to
a religious exemption from the state law prohibiting drug use.2'
The Court denied their claim, holding that exemptions from neutral,
generally applicable laws were only available when another consti-
tutional right, such as free speech, was implicated in conjunction
with religious exercise.2' Thus, because no other constitutional
right of the Native Americans was implicated by the state's crimi-
nal drug statute, they could not make out a free exercise claim.'
As a result of this holding, Smith was highly criticized by com-
mentators for misconstruing precedent and for essentially gutting
the compelling interest test.'
The Smith decision was also highly criticized by Congress. In
fact, there is significant evidence to suggest that RFRA was intend-
ed to overturn one Supreme Court decision, and to leave all other
free exercise decisions untouched. According to the House Judicia-
ison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); Laycock, supra note 4, at 896-97; James E.
Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assess-
ment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1438 (1992). The Flores court reasoned that RFRA met the
standards for a valid exercise of congressional power under Section 5, and that its enact-
ment did not violate the constitutional separation of powers by restoring an old judicial
test through legislation because the "judiciary's duty [] to say what the law is . . . is not
exclusive." 73 F.3d at 1363.
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19. Id. at 874. Peyote is a hallucinogen, and its use without a doctor's prescription
was illegal under state law. Id.
20. Id. at 876.
21. Id. at 882.
22. The Court stated that "[tihe only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech," and that
"[t]he present case does not present such a hybrid situation." Id. at 881-82.
23. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 4, at 114-16 (arguing that the Court manipulated
precedent and logic); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of
Supreme Court Centrism, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 260 (labeling Smith "substantively
wrong and institutionally irresponsible"); McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note
4, at 1111 (suggesting that Smith is contrary to the logic of the First Amendment); Ryan,
supra note 17, at 1409 n.15 (citing numerous law review articles). But see Marshall, In
Defense of Smith, supra note 4, at 308-09 (recognizing the inconsistencies of the Smith
opinion but defending its central contention).
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ry Committee report, RFRA "responds to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith by creating a statutory right requiring that the
compelling governmental interest test be applied in cases in which
the free exercise of religion has been burdened by a law of general
applicability." 4 Additionally, the Senate was also primarily con-
cerned with the effect of Smith on free exercise adjudication."
Furthermore, RFRA itself states that "Congress finds that ... in
Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court virtually elimi-
nated the requirement that the government justify burdens on reli-
gious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion." 6
Additionally, it appears that courts are to apply the RFRA
compelling interest standard by looking to all previous free exercise
precedent (excluding Smith). Although RFRA specifically cites
Sherbert and Yoder, the leading free exercise cases, the committee
reports make it clear that courts are to look to all free exercise
cases for guidance in applying the standard. 7 The House Commit-
tee Report states:
It is the Committee's expectation that the courts will look
to free exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for
guidance in determining whether or not religious exercise
has been burdened and the least restrictive means have
been employed in furthering a compelling governmental
interest. Furthermore ... the Committee neither approves
nor disapproves of the result in any particular court deci-
sion involving the free exercise of religion .... This bill is
not a codification of any prior free exercise decision but
rather the restoration of the legal standard that was applied
in those decisions. . . . [T]he [compelling interest] test
generally should not be construed more stringently or more
leniently than it was prior to Smith."5
24. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993) (footnote omitted).
25. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 7-8 (1993).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994) (citation omitted).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 24, at 7; S. REP. No. 11, supra note 25, at 8-
9. This may be difficult, given the variances in prior case law. See discussion infra part
I.B.1.
28. H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 24, at 6-7 (1993); S. REP. No. 111, supra note 25,
at 9. Similarly, the Senate Report states, "The committee wishes to stress that the act
does not express approval or disapproval of the result reached in any particular court
decision . . . . including those cited in the act itself." Id.
1076 [Vol. 46:1071
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Apart from the purported congressional intent, other factors
indicate RFRA will be applied narrowly. Due to the increasing
secularization of our society, religious free exercise claims are
generally not looked upon with favor, and the mere presence of a
statute will probably not change this trend.29 Additionally, pre-
Smith case law shows that Smith was not necessarily an aberration,
but a culmination of a growing judicial hostility to free exercise
claims.3"
Therefore, based on a surface reading of RFRA, the legislative
intent, and judicial and societal attitudes about free exercise claims,
RFRA will probably be applied narrowly, not as a sweeping
change in free exercise doctrine.31 The result of RFRA will likely
be to restore free exercise doctrine as it existed before Smith.
B. Free Exercise Doctrine Before Smith
If courts will be looking to pre-Smith case law in applying
RFRA, it is important to see how courts have approached the key
elements of the compelling interest test in the past. This section
will discuss the primary Supreme Court cases addressing each
element of the test and Part HI will then apply these cases to the
situation of a landlord seeking religious exemption from fair hous-
ing laws.
Under the compelling interest test, a free exercise claimant
must initially establish that the government has substantially bur-
dened her free exercise of religion.32 An examination of the lead-
ing burden cases will show that the Supreme Court has gradually
begun to impose more stringent standards for making out a legally
cognizable burden. Once a Free Exercise claimant shows that her
exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, the govern-
ment may justify the burden by showing that it is "in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest."33 The Court has defined a
29. Idelman, supra note 17, at 259-60.
30. See infra part I.B for a discussion of the pre-Smith case law. See also Idelman,
supra note 17, at 265-84 (comparing existing case law to the text of RFRA); Ryan, supra
note 17, at 1414-15 (reviewing the limited success of free exercise claimants prior to
Smith).
31. But see Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the
U.S. Code, 56 MoNT L. REV. 249, 253 (1995) (arguing that RFRA should be applied as
a "super-statute," implicitly modifying all federal law).
32. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
33. Id. § 2000bb-l(b)(1).
10771996]
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compelling state interest as "only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served."34 A brief look at the lead-
ing cases addressing the compelling interest test will show that the
determination of what qualifies as a compelling state interest de-
pends largely on the facts of the case. Finally, the government
must show that the burden to the free exercise claimant "is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."35
1. The Burden Requirement
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Amish claimants alleged that the
state compulsory school attendance laws burdened their religious
exercise, because higher education "tends to develop values they
reject as influences that alienate man from God."36 Because the
Amish religion is unique, dictating virtual isolation from society
and focusing on self-sufficiency, compulsory education violates its
religious principles.37 Thus, the Court held that the state statute
burdened the Amish by compelling them to violate the central
tenets of their religion under threat of criminal sanction."
In Sherbert v. Verner, the claimant, a Seventh-Day Adventist,
was fired due to her refusal to work on Saturday, her Sabbath.39
She was subsequently denied unemployment benefits by the state
when she could not obtain work due to the exercise of her reli-
gion.4 The Court held that the government's denial of unemploy-
ment benefits did constitute a substantial burden on her free exer-
cise of religion because of the financial pressure placed on her to
forego her religious practice.4' In doing so, the Court established
that the burden need not be a criminal sanction, but that it may be
more "indirect." 2
34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
35. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(2) (1994).
36. 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
37. Id. at 217-18.
38. Id. at 219.
39. 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
40. Id. at 401.
41. Id. at 406 ("[T]o condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willing-
ness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free
exercise of her constitutional liberties.").
42. Id. at 404. Thus, even though "the consequences of such a disqualification [from
unemployment compensation] . . . may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation
within the State's general competence to enact," it still constitutes a cognizable burden. Id.
at 403.
1078 [Vol. 46:1071
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More recently, however, the Court has applied a narrower
burden standard.43 In Bowen v. Roy, Native Americans refused to
comply with a federal requirement that AFDC (Aid to Families
with Dependent Children) applicants obtain social security num-
bers." The claimants asserted that obtaining a social security num-
ber for their daughter would violate their Native American religious
beliefs because it would "rob [her] spirit,"'4 as their beliefs dictat-
ed that a person's spirit be kept unique, free from any "identifi-
er."' The Court held that this objection did not constitute a bur-
den on the free exercise of the claimants' religion, because the
regulation pertained to an internal governmental procedure.47 In-
stead, the Court stated that the administrative requirement "may in-
deed confront some applicants for benefits with choices, but in no
sense does it affirmatively compel [the claimants], by threat of
sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct or to en-
gage in conduct that they find objectionable for religious rea-
sons."' Thus, the Court effectively determined that there could be
no "legally cognizable burden" because of internal government
procedures, even though the claimants had to choose whether to
violate their religious tenets.49
The Court developed the concept of burden as coercion ° in
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n.5" In Lyng,
Native American organizations challenged a United States Forest
Service plan to build a road and harvest timber in government-
owned land used by Native Americans for religious purposes.52
The Court held that despite the fact that "the Government's pro-
posed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of
their religion," the Native Americans did not demonstrate a legally
cognizable burden for free exercise purposes.53 Relying on the
43. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944 (1989) (observing that the Court's 1986
and 1988 cases "suggest that the Court may be prepared to narrow the set of conflicts
that will produce injury cognizable under the free exercise clause").
44. 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986).
45. Id. at 696.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 699-700.
48. Id. at 703.
49. Lupu, supra note 43, at 944-45.
50. Professor Lupu calls this the "coercion test." Id. at 945.
51. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
52. Id. at 443.
53. Id. at 447.
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Bowen decision, the Court stated that "the affected individuals
[would not] be coerced by the Government's action into violating
their religious beliefs. 54 In other words, the government action
did not affirmatively coerce the claimants into acting against their
religious beliefs, so there was no legally cognizable burden, even
though the government action made it more difficult to practice
central ideas of their religion.5 Thus, under Lyng, a Free Exercise
claimant cannot pass the threshold test of a burden if the govern-
mental action "[has] no tendency to coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs."56
Another key case addressing the burden issue is Mozert v.
Hawkins County Board of Education, where a group of Christian
parents challenged the public school's reading program as being
offensive to their religion. 7 The Mozert court held that mere ex-
posure to offensive ideas was not a burden on the free exercise of
religion, if the children were not required to affirmatively defy a
religious belief or engage in a forbidden act.5 Instead, the court
asserted that "'distinctions must be drawn between those govern-
mental actions that actually interfere with the exercise of religion,
and those that merely require or result in exposure to attitudes and
outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted by religion."' 59
Thus, although the Court initially recognized that indirect bur-
dens may be sufficient for free exercise claims, it has more recent-
ly refused to recognize a burden when governmental action serious-
ly interferes with central religious practices. Additionally, based on
these holdings, the Court would probably not recognize a burden if
it involves mere exposure to offensive material, as long as no
affirmative coercion to violate a religious tenet is present.
54. Id. at 449. Professor Lupu criticizes the implications of Lyng as "numerous and
disturbing." Lupu, supra note 43, at 945.
55. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450.
56. Id. at 450.
57. 827 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). The
parents, born-again Christians, objected to reading material about telepathy, supernaturalism,
and evolution. Id. at 1061-62.
58. Id. at 1065. The court distinguished Yoder on the basis that it had a "singular set
of facts." Id. at 1067. But see George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 886-88 (1988) (arguing that this characterization of Mozert is
too broad).
59. 827 F.2d at 1068 (quoting Grove City v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d
1528 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1986)).
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2. Sincerely Held Religious Belief
The burden on the free exercise claimant must be on that
individual's religious practice or belief. In other words, burdens on
the exercise of nonreligious moral beliefs do not suffice, as "[o]nly
beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,
which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of
religion."'  Thus, while a free exercise claim based on an
individual's religious objection to working in a military armaments
factory may be recognized, a nonreligious, moral objection to the
same work would not.6'
Additionally, in order to make out a claim, the trial court must
find that the claimant's religious beliefs are sincere, and not fraud-
ulent. In general, courts (and opposing parties) tend to shy away
from questioning a claimant's sincerity, because religious beliefs
are very subjective, and a probing examination of sincerity may
tend to discriminate against non-traditional religions.6' Therefore,
most free exercise cases are adjudicated on the burden and compel-
ling interest requirements.
3. Compelling Interest
In Sherbert v. Verner, after determining that the state's unem-
ployment compensation requirement substantially burdened a Sev-
enth-Day Adventist, the Court held that the state could not demon-
strate a compelling interest that justified the burden.' The state's
asserted interest was that allowing a religious exemption would
create the possibility of fraudulent claims, which in turn would
cause scheduling problems for Saturday work and diffuse the un-
employment compensation fund.' The Court held that this interest
was not close to overriding the claimant's First Amendment
60. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation . . . if it is based on purely secular
considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted
in religious belief.").
61. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713-16.
62. Lupu, supra note 43, at 954; see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 ("Courts should
not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling'
with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision
that a more sophisticated person might employ.").
63. 374 U.S. 398, 408-10 (1963).
64. Id. at 407.
10811996]
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rights.65 Instead, it held that barring extraordinary evidence, pre-
venting potentially fraudulent claims was *not sufficient.'
Wisconsin v. Yoder presented a more difficult search into the
state's compelling interest. In Yoder, the state argued that it had an
interest in compulsory education of all its citizens to a certain
minimum age. 7 The Court, however, held that this interest was
not compelling enough to justify burdening the Amish religion. 8
Instead, while acknowledging that the state generally may have a
compelling interest in requiring school attendance for children, it
noted that "[the state's] interest in compelling the school attendance
of Amish children to age 16 emerges as somewhat less substan-
tial."69 In doing so, the Court strongly emphasized the unique
Amish way of life and reliance on community self-sufficiency."
In United States v. Lee, the Court found a compelling interest
that did override an Amish farmer's claim for a religious exemp-
tion from the social security tax system.7 1 The Court held that the
public interest in maintaining a tax system outweighed the farmer's
religious objections to complying with such laws.72 Additionally, it
proposed that when religious groups enter into secular commercial
activities, the state's interest in regulation will be greater, stating
that "[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial
activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own
conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superim-
posed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that
activity. 73
65. Id. at 407-08.
66. Id.
67. 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
68. Id. at 228-29.
69. Id. at 228.
70. See id. at 222-28.
71. 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982). The farmer asserted that payment of social security
taxes on his Amish employees was improper because "both payment and receipt of social
security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith." Id. at 257.
72. Id. at 260. It may seem inconsistent that the Court would allow the Amish an
exemption from school due to their separate, religious way of life, but not from the social
security system. There seemed to be a real fear in Lee that allowing a religious exemp-
tion for the Amish would lead to other religious challenges to the tax system: "The tax
system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system
because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief." Id.
73. Id. at 261. The Court has also held that the governmental interest in regulation is
much greater in cases involving the military and prisons. See, e.g., Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (holding that the Air Force's desire for uniformity
of appearance was not outweighed by Orthodox Jew's First Amendment freedom to exer-
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of free exercise exemp-
tions from governmental antidiscrimination regulations in Bob
Jones University v. United States. 4 In Bob Jones University, two
private religious schools sought exemption from an IRS require-
ment that schools operate on a racially nondiscriminatory admission
basis in order to obtain tax exempt status.' Both schools operated
racially discriminatory admission policies based on their religious
belief that the mixing of the races is contrary to the teachings of
the Bible.76
There was no dispute about the burden placed on the religious
schools, as they were denied tax benefits because of their exercise
of religious beliefs. 7 The Court denied the claims for free exer-
cise exemptions, holding that "the Government has a fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in educa-
tion,"78 which outweighs the burden on the schools' religious ex-
ercise. The reasons for finding a compelling interest included eradi-
cation of the long history of discrimination in education and a
broad national policy barring such action.79
Thus, the Court's treatment of the compelling interest prong
mirrors its treatment of the "burden" requirement: while early
cases did grant some religious exemptions, most recent cases have
favored state interests over religious claimants' objections.
4. Least Restrictive Means
In United States v. Lee, the Court determined that there was no
less restrictive way of administering the social security tax system,
as it would be too difficult to operate the system while accounting
for religious exceptions."0 Instead, it held that the interest in main-
taining the tax system was so compelling that no religious exemp-
cise his religious beliefs by wearing a yarmulke); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 345 (1987) (holding that prison's policy requiring inmates to work during the time
of their religious services served legitimate penological interests and, therefore, did not
offend the inmates' First Amendment right to practice their religion).
74. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
75. Id. at 579, 583.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 604. This situation is similar to the "financial pressure" in the unemployment
compensation cases, where claimants were forced to choose between benefits generally
available to all citizens and violating their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
78. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604.
79. Id. at 594-95; see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
80. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61.
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tions could be granted."' Thus, the holding that no accommodation
could be made rested on two grounds: administrative difficulty and
the magnitude of the compelling interest. Similarly, in Bob Jones
University, the Court determined that there was no other less re-
strictive way to accommodate the schools' racially discriminatory
religious beliefs that would still implement the compelling purposes
of the antidiscrimination statute.82 Thus, the least restrictive means
prong of the compelling interest test has generally not been the
sole determinative factor in a free exercise case, but instead is
often used to support the Court's resolution of the other issues.
This summary of the major free exercise cases shows that
while the Court has recently become less receptive towards free
exercise claims, the cases are not consistent, and a claimant can
probably find federal precedent to support many arguments for
religious exemption. The next section will show how the federal
free exercise cases have been used in recent state cases addressing
landlords' claims for exemption from fair housing statutes with
different results.
II. FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS FROM FAIR HOUSING STATUTES
PROTECTING UNMARRIED COUPLES: RECENT CASES
Several recent state cases have addressed the issue of whether a
landlord may obtain a religious exemption from a fair housing
statute because of a belief that cohabitation or fornication is sin-
ful.83 This section will focus on Donahue and Swanner because
they reach contradictory conclusions, and because the courts' analy-
ses provide good examples of the reasoning in all the decisions."
81. Id. at 260 ("Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is
of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no
basis for resisting the tax.").
82. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603.
83. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal.
1996); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991), review granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); Attorney Gen.
v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2
(Minn. 1990).
84. In Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996), the
California Supreme Court essentially overruled the Donahue case, holding that the
landlord's religious belief was not "substantially burdened" under RFRA, and that the
landlord therefore could not obtain a religious exemption from the California fair housing
statute. Id. at 929. However, the reasoning of the Donahue court still serves as a repre-
1084 [Vol. 46:1071
1996] LANDLORDS SEEKING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION 1085
In Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,
Agnes and John Donahue refused to rent to an unmarried cohabit-
ing couple. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission
(FEHC) found that they illegally discriminated in violation of
California's housing statute." The Donahues were "devout Roman
Catholics" who believed "that sexual intercourse outside of mar-
riage [wa]s a mortal sin" and that to assist or facilitate such behav-
ior also constituted a sin.86 The California court of appeals held
that the landlords were entitled to a constitutionally compelled
exemption from compliance with the housing law. 7
In evaluating the Donahues' claim of a free exercise defense,
the court analyzed the facts under the compelling interest test.
88
sentative example of the reasoning used by several courts holding that such landlords are
entitled to religious exemptions.
85. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33-35. Unless unmarried couples are protected by stat-
ute from discrimination in housing, a free exercise defense will not even apply. In other
words, barring "marital status protection," landlords are free to discriminate against unmar-
ried couples.
Until recently, legislatures and courts generally did not protect marital status. John C.
Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Protection of
Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 1415, 1417 (1991). The Federal Fair Housing Act
does not list marital status as a protected classification. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1995).
Federal housing law does, however, protect marital status in two small categories: credit
and public housing. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1995);
Matthew J. Smith, Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in Housing
Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1055, 1068-71 (1992) (discussing
cases that held discrimination in public housing against unmarried couples to be illegal).
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia list marital status as a protected class in
their housing antidiscrimination statutes. Id. at 1074 & n.80.
Courts have differed over the definition of the term marital status. Some have inter-
preted it to protect only individuals, not couples. Id. at 1076-91 (examining case law on
both sides). For example, in State by Cooper v. French, the court held that Minnesota's
housing discrimination statute, which protected marital status, did not protect unmarried
couples from discrimination. 460 N.W.2d 2, 6-7 (Minn. 1990). However, others have
interpreted the term marital status to protect unmarried couples. See, e.g., Donahue, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 38; Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination,
547 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989).
Still, only a handful of states have definitively interpreted marital status to include
unmarried couples. Smith, supra, at 1078. These states include Alaska, California, Massa-
chusetts, and New Jersey. Id. at 1076-77.
Many times, municipal ordinances also protect unmarried couples from discrimination
in housing. See, e.g., Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278. Adding more protected classes appears to
be the recent trend in fair housing statutes. Beattie, supra, at 1417.
86. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33 n.l.
87. Id. at 33.
88. Id. at 39. At the time of this decision, Employment Division, Department of Hu-
man Resources v. Smith was the current Supreme Court precedent for the Federal con-
stitutional analysis. Id. The Donahue court addressed Employment Division v. Smith, noting
1086 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1071
The court determined that the Donahues' religious exercise was
burdened, defining this burden as "the choice [the Donahues] were
required to make between adhering to their religious beliefs by
refusing to rent to an unmarried cohabiting couple or modifying
their behavior to comply with [California's housing statute] and the
FEHC's order."89 The court also determined that the fact that this
discrimination occurred in the commercial context did not affect
the outcome of the case, stating that a person does not lose the
"constitutional right to the free exercise of religion just because the
clash between religious duty and governmental regulation occurs in
a commercial context."'  The court addressed Lee, but determined
that the burden on the landlords' religious exercise in this case was
more fundamental than in Lee.9
Finally, the court concluded that the government did not have a
compelling interest that could override the burden on the
Donahues' religious exercise. Although the state contended it had a
compelling interest in the eradication of invidious discrimination,
the court found this interest too general." The court described a
that this case may potentially present a "hybrid state constitutional claim . .. implicating
the Donahues' 'inalienable rights . . . [of] . . . enjoying . . . liberty, acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining . . . happiness'." Id. at 40 n.10
(citing CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1). However, the court determined that the state constitu-
tional free exercise doctrine, which applied the pre-Smith "compelling state interest analy-
sis," governed their decision. Id. at 39. This is the same analysis now required under
RFRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
89. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42. In Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, the court held that
the burden was established because
[tihe [fair housing] statute affirmatively obliges the defendants to enter into a
contract contrary to their religious beliefs and provides significant sanctions for
its violation. Moreover, both their nonconformity to the law and any related
publicity may stigmatize the defendants in the eyes of many and thus burden
the exercise of the defendants' religion.
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 237-38.
90. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43; see also Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 238 ("The fact
that the defendants' free exercise of religion claim arises in a commercial context, al-
though relevant when engaging in a balancing of interests, does not mean that their con-
stitutional rights are not substantially burdened.").
91. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43 ("Here, the burden was personal and spiritual
as well as financial, as indicated by the substantial monetary sanctions and other penalties
imposed by the FEHC.").
92. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44. In fact, the court implicitly questioned whether
there was any governmental interest in prohibiting discrimination in housing against un-
married couples, stating that "[t]he FEHC has not only failed to establish a compelling
governmental interest, but has also failed to explain what exactly is so invidious or un-
fairly offensive in not treating unmarried cohabiting couples as if they were married." Id.
at 46. This statement seems to imply that the court perceived some sort of requirement
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"hierarchy" of state interests beginning with the prohibition of
racial discrimination in education, noting that prohibiting marital
status discrimination in housing is not highly ranked because "Cali-
fornia has, in effect, sanctioned and judicially enforced discrimina-
tion against cohabiting couples in contexts other than housing."'
Addressing the FEHC's argument that the state has another
compelling interest in providing housing, the court concluded that
its ruling would only limit the housing options available to unmar-
ried couples, not make housing unavailable to them.94 Thus, the
Donahue court held that the state's asserted interests were not
sufficiently compelling to overcome the substantial burden on the
claimants' religious exercise.
The Alaska Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion in
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission." There, three
prospective tenants were rejected by a landlord, Tom Swanner,
because they each intended to cohabit with a member of the oppo-
site sex." Under Swanner's Christian religious beliefs, unmarried
couples may not cohabitate, so that in his view "even a nonsexual
living arrangement by roommates of the opposite sex is immoral
and sinful because such an arrangement suggests the appearance ofimmorality."'
In evaluating Swanner's claim for a constitutionally compelled
exemption, the court applied the federal compelling interest test.9"
that a couple be married in order to live together.
93. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44. These other contexts include the right to sue for
loss of consortium, unemployment compensation, standing to sue for wrongful death, and
the marital communication privilege. Id. The court noted that while the law has recog-
nized unmarried cohabitation as a "modem reality," it has "not affirmatively promoted it
as a matter of government policy." Id. at 45; cf Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405 (noting
the state's strong interest in promoting marriage); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 245 (citing the
state's criminal fornication law); French, 460 N.W.2d at 10 (observing that marriage is a
"'preferred status"').
94. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45 (stating that the "Donahues' discrimination does
not compel the unavailability of all suitable housing"); see also Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
407-08 (stating that "in light of dominant community mores, it is entirely likely complain-
ants could live together for the rest of their lives and never again confront discrimination
because of their unmarried status").
95. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska) (holding that the landlord discriminated against potential
tenants based on their marital status and that he was not deprived of his free exercise
rights by the statute), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
96. Id. at 276.
97. Id. at 277.
98. Id. at 281. As in the Donahue case, free exercise adjudication was operating under
the Smith decision at the time of this controversy, so the court based its decision on the
state constitutional free exercise protections. Id. at 280. Alaska courts had also adopted
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While the court held that Swanner met the preliminary require-
ments under a state case allowing broad interpretation of the bur-
den requirement necessary to invoke a free exercise defense," it
concluded that the government had a compelling interest that out-
weighed the landlord's free exercise interest." °
The court identified two governmental interests: an interest in
"providing access to housing for all," and a separate interest in
"preventing acts of discrimination based on irrelevant characteris-
tics."'' 1 The court determined that the more general interest was
compelling enough to override Swanner's exemption claim, stating,
"[t]he government views acts of discrimination as independent
social evils even if the prospective tenants ultimately find hous-
ing.",0 2
Additionally, the court was not persuaded that the fact that the
state discriminates against unmarried couples in other areas showed
that it had a lesser interest.0 3 Moreover, as Swanner's free exer-
cise claim arose in the context of voluntary commercial activity,
the court analogized Swanner's claim to Lee, concluding that "[vol-
untary] commercial activity does not receive the same status ac-
corded to directly religious activity."'"
Thus, each court, in applying the same compelling interest test,
came to quite different conclusions. Part III will analyze the deci-
sions of these courts under RFRA's requirements, examine other
alternative arguments not raised in these decisions, and conclude
that landlords should not be given religious exemption from fair
housing laws in order to discriminate against unmarried couples.
the Sherbert compelling interest test, the test codified in RFRA. Id. at 281.
99. Id. at 281.
100. In Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996),
the California Supreme Court ultimately reached the same conclusion, but with different
reasoning. There, the court held that the landlord seeking religious exemption from
California's fair housing law did not meet RFRA's "burden" requirement. Id. at 929.
Thus, the court did not reach the issue of whether the state had a compelling interest in
applying the fair housing statute over a religious objection. Id.
101. Id. at 282.
102. Id. at 283; see also French, 460 N.W.2d at 19 (Popovich, J., dissenting) ("We
should reaffirm that the prevention of invidious discrimination in Minnesota, including on
the basis of marital status, is a compelling state interest.").
103. Instead, the court limited the issue to the eradication of discrimination in housing,
noting that other policies discriminating against unmarried couples are "irrelevant."
Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283; see also infra part III.B.l.b (discussing treatment of unmarried
couples in other areas of the law).
104. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283.
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III. ANALYsIs
A. Burden
Under RFRA, there must be a "substantial burden" on a
landlord's religious exercise in order to make out a prima facie
case for a free exercise defense.' 5 There is a serious question
about whether the housing laws in these cases constitute a substan-
tial burden on a landlord's exercise of religion.
Both the Swanner and Donahue courts accepted the premise
that the landlord's free exercise of religion was burdened by the
state's fair housing statute."es A careful analysis shows that the
courts' examinations of this requirement were not sufficient and
that in each case, the initial burden aspect of the free exercise test
was not necessarily met.
1. "Appearance" of Immoral Conduct
In Swanner, the landlord believed that nonsexual cohabitation
by members of the opposite sex was "sinful" because it "sug-
gest[ed] the appearance of immorality."' 7 If this statement accu-
rately reflected the landlord's belief, then he was, in effect, claim-
ing that the housing discrimination statute was burdening him
because it forced him to rent to individuals who, under his reli-
gious beliefs, appeared to be committing a sin.
Recognizing a burden in this case is very problematic. The
government was not coercing the landlord himself into committing
this "immoral" behavior.' 3 In effect, the housing statute was
merely requiring the landlord to be exposed to another's conduct
(or appearance of conduct) that offends his religious beliefs.'"
105. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
106. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281; Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42. Neither of the courts
challenged the parties' sincerity of belief, or contended that the beliefs were not based in
religion.
107. Swarmer, 874 P.2d at 277; see also French, 460 N.W.2d at 4 ("[The landlord]
believes that living together constitutes the 'appearance of evil' and would not have rented
to them on that basis.").
108. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449
(1988) (holding that the governmental action must coerce the claimant into violating a
religious tenet); see also supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. This is different from
facilitation, infra part III.A.2 (differentiating facilitation, which concerns the role of the
religious individual, from coercion, which concerns the role of the state).
109. This exposure would probably only take place in the rental relationship between
the landlord and tenants, not in the actual living facility. If the landlord lived in the same
dwelling, he would probably be exempted from compliance with antidiscrimination laws,
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There is some question as to whether mere exposure to ideas
offensive to one's religion is sufficiently burdensome." In
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, the court held that
mere exposure to reading material that offends a student's religious
beliefs did not constitute a sufficient burden for a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause."' Therefore, under the Lyng coercion test,
and the Mozert exposure rule, the landlord who refuses to rent to
cohabitants because she objects to their behavior would not pass
the burden requirement.
2. "Facilitation" of Another's "Sin"
In Donahue, the landlords believed that nonmarital sexual inter-
course is a "mortal sin," and that "assisting or facilitating such
behavior also constitutes a sin.""' 2 Similarly, in Attorney General
v. Desilets, the landlords "believe[d] that they should not facilitate
sinful conduct, including fornication.""' 3 Under this belief, the
connection is less of a problem. The landlord is actually facilitating
the cohabitation (or fornication) by renting them an apartment.
Thus, the fair housing statute does directly burden the free exercise
of religion of a landlord who believes that facilitating the cohabita-
tion of others is a sin.
The idea of facilitation avoids the Mozert holding because it
raises the issue beyond mere exposure to offensive conduct or
beliefs."' Additionally, the landlord is being coerced into violat-
ing his tenets and facilitating another's sin."'
A religious tenet that prohibits facilitation of another's sins
raises problems. Arguably, many activities can be causally related,
because most fair housing laws exempt small, owner-occupied dwellings. See, e.g., Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1995) (exempting owner-occupied dwellings if intend-
ed for residence by less than four families).
110. This case is distinguishable from the free exercise cases addressing governmental
requirements of affirmation of a belief offensive to one's religion. See, e.g., West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding a requirement that school
children pledge and salute the flag unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses).
Here, on the other hand, a fair housing act does not require the landlord to affim or
accept the tenants' belief in cohabitation.
111. 827 F.2d 1058, 1068-69 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); see
also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
112. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
113. 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994).
114. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Mozert holding).
115. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Lyng coercion re-
quirement).
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albeit indirectly." 6 However, even though the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship is closely related, any burden on the landlord's religious
beliefs is still marginal. Therefore, in those cases where a landlord
sincerely believes, based upon her religion," 7 that it is a sin to
facilitate the cohabitation of an unmarried couple, the landlord
should pass the burden requirement."' However, any legally rec-
ognized burden should be relatively weak, because the landlord is
essentially objecting to someone else's behavior.
Thus, the exact clarity of the landlord's religious belief has a
major effect on the finding of a burden in these cases." 9 It is
likely that each landlord's religious beliefs were slightly differ-
ent."2 In fact, this is exactly what the Free Exercise Clause is
supposed to protect: diverse religious beliefs. As a result, a land-
lord who objects to the facilitation of cohabitation will be able to
demonstrate a tenuous burden, while a landlord who only objects
to cohabitation will not.
116. For example, a person with a sincere religious objection to war might assert that
payment of taxes burdened his religious exercise if his taxes were used to facilitate a
war. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (recognizing, hypothetically, that
a taxpayer might, based on his religious beliefs, be able to object to specific tax dollars
being spent to finance a war, but further recognizing that it is impossible to differentiate
tax dollars and therefore impossible to allow such an objection to prevail).
117. Presumably, if the landlord's objection was based on a nonreligious, moral opposi-
tion to nonmarital cohabitation, her claim would fail because it is not based upon exercise
of a religious belief. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
118. But see Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912, 929
(Cal. 1996) (holding that a landlord's religious belief that "it is a sin . . . to rent . . . to
people who engage in nonmarital sex on her property" was not substantially burdened
under RFRA). The court reasoned that the landlord's religious belief was not substantially
burdened because (1) her religion did not require her to rent apartments, so she could
avoid violating this belief by making other investments; (2) while compliance with the fair
housing statute might make the landlord's religious practice more expensive, it was still
an incidental burden; and (3) granting the exemption would detrimentally affect the
tenants' rights. Id. at 928-29. While these are legitimate reasons for refusing to grant an
exemption, they do not necessarily implicate the "burden" requirement. Instead, these rea-
sons tend to indicate that the government has a more compelling interest in enforcing the
fair housing statute.
119. This assertion implicates the judicial concern about questioning the sincerity and
exactitude of the religious belief. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. However, this
inquiry is necessary because of the narrow burden standard outlined by the Court.
120. In his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Swanner, Justice Thomas characterized
the landlord's religious belief differently, stating that the landlord had a sincere belief that
"cohabitation is a sin and that he would be facilitating the sin by renting to cohabitants."
115 S. Ct. 460, 460 (1994). If this was in fact Swanner's belief, then he might meet the
burden requirement; however, Justice Thomas's description of the landlord's belief is sig-
nificantly different than the Alaska Supreme Court's. See supra note 107 and accompany-
ing text.
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B. Compelling Interest
It is generally accepted that the government has an interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination in access to housing.' Addi-
tionally, the states that outlaw discrimination in housing against
unmarried couples have shown that they have some interest in
protecting against discrimination on the basis of marital status.
However, the mere presence of a statute does not by itself indicate
a compelling governmental interest; if it did, the entire compelling
interest test would be swallowed up, because any statute would
automatically pass the compelling interest standard.' There must
be other evidence to justify the government's intrusion on religious
exercise." Thus, any compelling interest critique must look be-
yond the mere existence of the statute, to the reasons and interests
behind enforcement of the statute. Some governmental interests that
potentially justify burdening a landlord's free exercise of religion
include (1) an interest in eradicating discrimination on the basis of
marital status, in general or specifically in housing, (2) an interest
in protecting the tenants' privacy interests, (3) an interest in pro-
viding individual tenants with housing, and (4) an interest in regu-
lating commercial activity.
1. Compelling Interest in Eradicating Discrimination on the Basis
of Marital Status
The Supreme Court has found a "fundamental, overriding inter-
est in eradicating racial discrimination in education[,] '"' 4 and in
eradicating gender discrimination in public accommodations.s
However, it is not clear whether this reasoning can be extended to
unmarried couples in the context of housing. Some courts have
argued that the classification of marital status is much different
121. Even the courts that allowed free exercise exemptions for landlords objecting to
cohabitation acknowledge this. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 404 (Cal. Ct. App.) ("California has a significant interest in eradicating
discrimination in employment and housing."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 913 P.2d
909 (Cal. 1996); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 13 Cal. App. 4th 350,
373 (1991), review granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992).
122. Paulsen, supra note 31, at 256 ("The mere fact that Congress has passed a law on
the subject or struck a balance in a particular way ...does not qualify as a compelling
interest ....").
123. See Ryan, supra note 17, at 1416 (observing that free exercise claimants face a
"catch-22" because courts usually find that a government intrusion substantial enough to
be called a burden is compelling enough to override the free exercise claim).
124. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
125. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
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from race or gender, so that any state interest in preventing dis-
crimination is significantly lessened."a However, examination of
case law will show that the compelling interests behind eradication
of race and gender discrimination should be extended to marital
status discrimination.
a. All Protected Classes Are Not Alike
Antidiscrimination statutes generally list a number of classes of
people without distinguishing between the interests in protecting
each. However, as demonstrated by constitutional equal protec-
tion doctrines, there is a convincing argument that protected classes
are not equal in terms of governmental interests." Under equal
protection doctrine, classifications based on marital status receive
only rational basis scrutiny. 29
However, the fact that a group or class is not a suspect class
under equal protection doctrine does not end the analysis for the
purposes of the compelling interest test. In an equal protection
challenge, a claimant alleges that the state treats her differently
from similarly situated individuals, and that this unequal treatment
in the law violates her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal pro-
tection. 3 Here, the state has already chosen to protect the class
of unmarried couples; therefore, the question is whether the state
126. See, e.g., Swanner, 115 S. Ct. at 461 (Thomas, J., dissenting from a denial of
certiorari) (distinguishing Bob Jones University because of the difference between racial
discrimination and marital status discrimination); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("[lit cannot be said [that] the
goal of eliminating discrimination on the basis of unmarried status enjoys equal priority
with the state public policy of eliminating racial discrimination."), aff d in part and rev'd
in part, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 239
(Mass. 1994) (noting that the Massachusetts state constitution prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, but not marital status).
127. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(a) (West 1996) (prohibiting discrimination in public
accommodations on the basis of "race, color, religion or national origin"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1995) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a) (West 1996) (prohibiting
discrimination in housing on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or na-
tional origin").
128. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985) (observ-
ing that in equal protection analysis, classifications based on race, alienage, or national
origin receive strict scrutiny, classifications based on gender receive heightened scrutiny,
and classifications based on other categories receive rational basis scrutiny).
129. Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a distinction based
on marital status receives only rational basis scrutiny in an equal protection challenge),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1309 (1994).
130. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTrrulONAL LAW 601 (12th ed. 1991).
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has a compelling interest in protecting this class, not whether the
class itself is suspect or constitutionally protected.'3 ' The state
may have many different reasons for protecting a certain group
through antidiscrimination laws; some of these may be compelling,
while others may not. Therefore, for purposes of the compelling
interest test, the presence of a suspect class is not dispositive,
although it may be highly relevant. Thus, the government's com-
pelling interest does not have to be the protection of a fundamental
constitutional right.'32
It is important to examine cases that find compelling state
interests in protecting certain groups from discrimination, so that
one may determine what makes an antidiscrimination interest com-
pelling enough to outweigh infringement of a constitutional right.
An analysis of these cases will show that there are four major
reasons that courts find protection of certain groups compelling: (1)
there is a clear, national policy of protecting the group from dis-
crimination; (2) the particular group has suffered from a history of
discrimination or stereotyping that must be remedied; (3) the act of
discrimination against an individual in the protected class creates a
stigma, stereotype, or loss of equal opportunity; and (4) acts of dis-
crimination in general are evils, so the government has a more
general compelling interest in eradicating invidious discrimination
and promoting civil rights.
The only Supreme Court case addressing the issue of a free
exercise exemption from an antidiscrimination statute is Bob Jones
University v. United States,'33 a case involving two private reli-
gious schools that maintained racially discriminatory admissions
policies.'34 While the schools asserted that their religion dictated
separation of the races, so that an IRS antidiscrimination require-
ment interfered with their religious exercise, the Court held that the
compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
outweighed the schools' First Amendment free exercise rights.'35
131. See RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
132. For example, the Court has determined that education may be a compelling govern-
mental interest, even though there is no constitutional right to education. Compare Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228-29 (1972) (observing that a state may generally have
a compelling interest in educating children), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that there is no fundamental constitutional fight to
education).
133. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
134. Id. at 580-81, 583.
135. Id. at 604.
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One reason the Court gave for finding a compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination was the long history of racial discrimina-
tion in education, which "prevailed, with official approval, for the
first 165 years of this Nation's constitutional history."'36 Addi-
tionally, the Court emphasized the "fundamental policy of eliminat-
ing racial discrimination,"'37 citing the line of cases beginning
with Brown v. Board of Education as well as numerous efforts by
the executive and legislative branches to stop racial discrimination
in education.' Thus, the Court's compelling interest analysis
rested on rationales of the history of racial discrimination and the
broad national policy promoting racial equality.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,39 the Court found a
compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination in places of
public accommodation that overrode the Jaycees' First Amendment
right of association." In Roberts, the United States Jaycees, a
civic organization, had refused to grant full membership rights to
women.'4 ' This action violated a Minnesota statute that makes it
illegal to discriminate on the basis of sex in places of public ac-
commodation.42 As a defense, the Jaycees asserted that the stat-
ute infringed their First Amendment rights of free speech and
association.'4
3
Noting that "[ilnfringements on [the right of association] may
be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state inter-
ests," the Court held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradi-
cating gender discrimination justified any infringement.'" The
Court advanced three basic arguments in its compelling interest
analysis. The Court recognized the history of gender discrimination,
stating that the state has a compelling interest in "removing the
barriers to economic advancement and political and social integra-
tion that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups,
136. Id.
137. Id. at 595.
138. Id. at 593-96.
139. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
140. Id. at 623.
141. Id. at 613.
142. At the time of this case, Minnesota's Human Rights Act provided that "'[i]t is an
unfair discriminatory practice[ tlo deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public
accommodation because of . . . sex."' Id. at 614-15 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.03,
subd. 3 (1982)).
143. Id. at 615.
144. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (1984).
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including women."'4
A second reason the Court gave for this holding was the asser-
tion that the state has a compelling interest in preventing the stig-
ma of discrimination and denials of equal opportunity: "discrimina-
tion based on archaic and overbroad assumptions" about the sexes
deprives individuals of their "dignity."'" Finally, the Court
concluded that the state has a compelling interest in generally
preventing acts of invidious discrimination, maintaining, "acts of
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available
goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that gov-
ernment has a compelling interest to prevent."' 47 Thus, while the
government's compelling interest in Bob Jones University centered
on remedying historical barriers as well as a broad national policy,
the Roberts Court found compelling interests not only in eradicat-
ing historical barriers, but also in preventing individuals from ac-
quiring the stigma of discrimination and in generally deterring
invidious discrimination in public accommodations.
The reasoning given by the Court in Bob Jones University has
some application to the issue of marital status discrimination in
housing. Unmarried couples can point to a history of discrimina-
tion, even if it is not as prevalent or severe as the history of race
or gender discrimination. Historically, most states had statutes
making cohabitation a crime. 4 Most of these have been repealed,
but several states still have these laws.'49 Additionally, unmarried
couples have historically been discriminated against in enforcement
of property agreements. 5 ' Despite this history, however, there is
no fundamental national policy of protecting unmarried couples.'
The additional rationales given in Roberts regarding the stigma
of discrimination, and the general evils of allowing discrimination
have more application to unmarried couples. Persons discriminated
145. Id. at 626.
146. Id. at 625. Equating the injuries of gender discrimination to race, the Court stated
that the "stigmatizing injury [of discrimination], and the denial of equal opportunities that
accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis
of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race." Id.
147. Id. at 628.
148. Smith, supra note 85, at 1059 & nn.28-29.
149. Id. at 1059 n.29. The continuing existence of statutes making cohabitation a crime
is very interesting, given the fact that in 1989, 2,764,000 unmarried couples were cohabit-
ing. Id. at 1058.
150. Id. at 1060-61.
151. See supra note 85 (discussing the few state and federal statutes that do prohibit
discrimination on the basis of marital status).
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against on the basis of marital status also suffer from a stigma
based on their nonadherance to others' religious convictions or
moral beliefs.'52 They also suffer the "denial of equal opportuni-
ties that accompanies" the stigma of discrimination. 3 Finally, the
government's general interest in eradicating discrimination impli-
cates marital status discrimination as well as gender discrimination.
There are, however, fundamental differences that separate the
fair housing/marital status cases from Bob Jones University and
Roberts. First, race and gender are distinguishable from marital
status. Generally, race and gender are immutable characteristics,
while an individual's marital status may change. 4 Thus, it is ar-
guable that discrimination on the basis of marital status is less
invidious because it is often based on a mutable, moral choice, not
an immutable physical characteristic.' Additionally, there are
times when the state does have an interest in promoting marriage,
or a certain marital status,5 6 whereas it is unlikely that the state
ever has an interest in promoting one race over another, or one
gender over the other. Finally, it may be argued that Bob Jones
University and Roberts can be distinguished based on the type of
discrimination prohibited (education and public accommodations
antidiscrimination statutes, as opposed to fair housing laws). How-
ever, it would be difficult to support an assertion that access to
housing is any less important or fundamental than access to educa-
tion or public accommodations.
Decisions by other courts support the argument that the state
may have a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against
groups traditionally less protected than race and gender. In Gay
Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v.
152. Beattie, supra note 85, at 1435-36, 1445 ("Such [discriminatory] policies lend cre-
dence to the stereotype that nonmarital relationships are transitory, frivolous, morally rep-
rehensible, or simply unimportant."); Robert C. Mueller, Comment, Donahue v. Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission: A Free Exercise Defense to Marital Status Discrimi-
nation?, 74 B.U. L. REv. 145, 157, 170 (1994); Smith, supra note 85, at 1092.
153. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
154. Beattie, supra note 85, at 1428 ("Unlike sex, race, or disability, for instance, a
person can change her marital status with relative ease.").
155. ld; see also Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual
Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393,
401-04 (1994) (arguing that while race is a "morally neutral characteristic[,] ... (s]exual
conduct and preferences are fraught with moral and religious significance").
156. Cf. infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (reviewing areas of the law that
treat married couples more beneficially than unmarried couples).
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Georgetown University,"7 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals held that the compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation outweighed a university's First
Amendment free exercise rights.'58 In Georgetown University, two
student groups charged that Georgetown University violated the
District of Columbia's Human Rights Act by refusing to grant
them university recognition and access on the basis of their sexual
orientation.'59 As a defense, Georgetown University asserted that
compliance with the statute would violate its right to free exercise
of religion, as its Roman Catholic teachings forbid giving universi-
ty benefits to homosexual student groups."
The court gave several reasons for determining that a compel-
ling governmental interest in eradication of sexual orientation dis-
crimination overrode the burden on the university's free exercise
rights. The court rested its decision on the rationale that eradicating
discrimination based on historical moral attitudes that are unrelated
to individual merit is a compelling governmental interest.' In
support of this, the court cited studies showing a history of dis-
crimination against homosexuals as well as studies showing that
homosexuality is an ingrained part of society, and has no relation
to an individual's merit as a person. 62 Finally, the court conclud-
ed that since discrimination in general harms society, the state has
a compelling interest in eradicating all forms of invidious discrimi-
nation. 63 These arguments should also be applicable to the issue
of marital status discrimination in housing, as marital status has
nothing to do with one's merit as a tenant. 64 The court's holding
also shows that invidious discrimination can occur even if the pro-
157. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
158. Id. at 5, 38.
159. Id. at 4, 5. The Human Rights Act prohibits an educational institution from deny-
ing "access to [] any of its facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified...
based upon the . . . sexual orientation . . . of any individual . Id. at 5 n.1 (em-
phasis in original) (citing D.C. CODE § 1-2520 (1987)).
160. Id. at 31. While acknowledging that the issue of the burden on Georgetown
University's religious exercise was questionable, the court declined to thoroughly examine
it because the parties had not "fully developed" the issue. Id. Instead, the court accepted
the assertion that the antidiscrimination statute burdened the university and addressed the
compelling governmental interest issue. Id.
161. Id. at 33.
162. Id. at 33-38.
163. Id. at 37-38.
164. Smith, supra note 85, at 1092 ("A couple's marital status alone does not indicate
whether the couple will make good tenants or neighbors.").
1098 [Vol. 46: 107 1
LANDLORDS SEEKING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION
tected group is not a constitutionally suspect class.
Addressing the lack of a broad national policy of protecting
homosexuals from discrimination, the Georgetown University court
concluded that a compelling interest need not be national. 65 In-
stead, the court found a broad District of Columbia policy in sup-
port of eradication of sexual orientation discrimination."6a Similar-
ly, a state that prohibits marital status discrimination in many ar-
eas, such as employment, public accommodations, and housing,
may demonstrate such a broad state policy.
In State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club,67 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that the state does have a compelling
interest in eradicating marital status discrimination in employ-
ment. 6 In McClure, three fundamentalist Christians who owned a
health club conducted a practice of questioning applicants for em-
ployment about their marital status, refusing to hire homosexuals or
individuals who cohabited with a member of the opposite sex.'69
These employment practices violated the Minnesota Human Rights
Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
marital status. 7
As a defense, the club owners asserted that enforcement of the
Act violated their First Amendment rights to free speech, exercise
of religion, and association.' The court held that the
government's compelling interest in "prohibiting discrimination in
employment and public accommodation" overrode the owners'
religious objections." The court cited several cases in support,
165. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d at 38 n.25.
166. Id. at 32-33.
167. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
168. Id. at 853.
169. Id. at 846-47.
170. Id. at 850. The court stated the following:
Sports and Health, in some instances, went far beyond legally permissible
bounds in questioning applicants and employees. The evidence clearly substanti-
ates the findings of the hearing examiner that questioning concerning religious
beliefs, practices and concerning marital status permeated the employment pro-
cess and were the true reasons for the actions taken by Sports and Health.
Id.
171. Id. The court treated the three claims essentially as a free exercise claim, because
the assertions were all based in the religious beliefs of the club owners. Id. at 850 n.11.
172. Id. at 853. The court did not examine the burden requirement because the state did
not challenge the club owners' assertion that the statute burdened their religious exercise.
Id. at 852. Apparently, the objection was that the club owners did not want to "subsi-
dize" an "immoral relationship" through employment. Id. at 858 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
However, given the discussion supra, part HI.A, dealing with the "immoral" actions of
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including Bob Jones University and Roberts, where the
government's interest in supporting individual civil rights out-
weighed constitutional rights.'73 It did not, however, examine the
differences accorded to the various protected classes, or address
any type of historical or stigma arguments. Instead, it determined
that the enhancement of civil rights, and the prohibition against
discrimination in employment for all citizens was a compelling
interest in itself.
74
Thus, McClure stands for the proposition that the state's inter-
est in promoting civil rights and eradicating discrimination for all
protected groups is sufficiently compelling to outweigh a religious
objection.7 This reasoning, along with the other rationales of
Georgetown University, Roberts, and Bob Jones University should
be applied and extended to the fair housing/marital status cases to
establish a compelling state interest in eradicating marital status
discrimination in housing.
One theme running through all the cases is the idea that invidi-
ous discrimination, in any form, harms society in general, so that
the government has a compelling interest in eradicating arbitrary
discrimination against all groups, and enhancing civil rights for all
citizens. However, some courts have argued that unmarried couples
are disfavored in other areas of the law, and so discrimination
against this group is not invidious, and the interest in promoting
civil rights of this group, therefore, is not compelling. 7'
employees may not have legally burdened the employer in this situation.
173. Id. at 852.
174. Id. at 853. The court stated,
In a pluralistic and democratic society, government has a responsibili-
ty to insure that all its citizens have equal opportunity for employment, promo-
tion, and job retention without having to overcome the artificial and largely
irrelevant barriers occurring from gender, status, or beliefs to the main decision
of competence to perform the work. Likewise, the government has a responsi-
bility to afford its citizens equal access to all accommodations open to the
general public.
Id.
175. Cf. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
549 (1987) ("[P]ublic accommodations laws 'plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of
the highest order."' (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624
(1984))).
176. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 239-40 & n.10 (Mass. 1994)
(holding that marital status discrimination is not a strong state concern because Massachu-
setts has no constitutional prohibition against discriminating on the basis of marital status).
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b. Treatment of Unmarried Couples in Other Areas of the Law
One reason cited for the argument that the government has no
compelling interest in protecting marital status from discrimination
is that unmarried couples are not favored in other areas of the
law."7 This argument has two different aspects: first, some states
have fornication laws making sexual intercourse between unmarried
couples a crime; second, several other areas of the law frequently
distinguish between married and unmarried couples.
i. Fornication Laws
In Attorney General v. Desilets, the court noted that Massachu-
setts still has a statute on the books making fornication a
crime.' Although observing that the statute was of doubtful con-
stitutionality under the Massachusetts Constitution, the court con-
cluded that because fornication remains a crime on the books, the
state's interest in protecting unmarried couples from discrimination
was diminished.'79 Although this assertion is accurate, based on a
facial reading of the criminal statue, it is difficult to support in
light of the treatment of fornication laws.
Thirteen states still make fornication a crime. 8 However,
these laws are not enforced,' and are of questionable constitu-
tionality, at least as applied to consenting heterosexual adults. 2
Additionally, many states have either repealed these types of laws,
177. See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990).
178. 636 N.E.2d at 240; see also French, 460 N.W.2d at 10 (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 609.34 (1988)).
179. The court cited a Massachusetts state case for the proposition that the state fornica-
tion statute may be unconstitutional as applied to consensual, private conduct between
adults. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 240; see also Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d
478, 481 (Mass. 1974) (holding that the Massachusetts law "must be construed to be
inapplicable to private consensual conduct of adults").
180. Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extra-
marital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1661 n.9 (1991). These states include Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id.
181. Id. at 1661 & n.11. Generally, the few arrests made are discriminatory, used to
apprehend "suspected prostitutes, rapists and other criminals." Id. at 1662 (citations omit-
ted).
182. Id. at 1665-68 (arguing that such laws may be unconstitutional, as applied to con-
senting heterosexual adults, under Griswold and its progeny).
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or overturned them in the judicial system.'83
Therefore, it is difficult to support the argument that fornication
statutes show that a state cannot have a compelling interest in
protecting unmarried couples from discrimination in housing.
8 4
They are outdated, unenforced (and possibly unenforceable) crimi-
nal statutes that may be unconstitutional. Therefore, they are not
persuasive enough to show that the state does not have a compel-
ling interest in providing housing for unmarried couples.
ii. Other Areas of the Law with Differential
Treatment for Unmarried Couples
All of the courts that addressed the issue of a compelling inter-
est in the eradication of marital status discrimination in housing
recognized that unmarried couples are not treated the same as
spouses in other areas of the law.' 5 For example, unmarried cou-
ples are often treated differently from married couples in the areas
of torts, property law, and employee benefits.'86 Additionally, they
generally cannot bring an action for wrongful death or loss of
consortium, are generally not entitled to employee benefits normal-
ly available to spouses and other family members, and are not
allowed to assert the marital communication privilege.' 7
These differences show that the state does not have a compel-
ling interest in treating unmarried couples the same as married
couples at all times. However, it does not mean that there is not a
compelling interest in the area of eradicating discrimination in
housing. Although there are specific reasons why the state distin-
guishes between individuals based on their marital status in certain
areas of the law, the reasoning does not apply to the aims of fair
housing laws.
The reasons for differentiating between married and unmarried
couples in such non-housing areas are to protect against fraud in
dispensing benefits and to avoid the difficulties of determining
183. Smith, supra note 85, at 1059 & n.30.
184. In Georgetown University, the court accepted the government's compelling interest
in protecting sexual orientation discrimination despite the existence of a District of Colum-
bia law making sodomy a crime. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v.
Georgetown Univ, 536 A.2d 1, 75 (D.C. App. 1987) (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
185. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283; French, 460 N.W.2d at 10; Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at
239-40; Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404-05; Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-45.
186. See Beattie, supra note 85, at 1444 (discussing differential treatment in torts and
property law); Smith, supra note 85, at 1063-64 (concerning employee benefits).
187. See Beattie, supra note 85, at 1444; Smith, supra note 85, at 1063-64.
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whether a relationship is truly intimate and genuine. 88 A mar-
riage certificate makes it much easier to determine who is eligible
for benefits, for example, even if it does not accurately measure
intangible feelings or genuineness. 9 Furthermore, it creates a
barrier for preventing fraudulent claims for benefits. However, this
reasoning does not translate into housing discrimination cases.
There is no concern about fraud in obtaining housing; instead, the
concern is over basic access and invidious discrimination."9
Additionally, the government may sometimes differentiate be-
tween married and unmarried couples because it has an interest in
promoting marriage. However, this does not mean that the state
does not also have an interest in prohibiting discrimination against
unmarried couples in housing." Some courts that addressed this
issue missed this important distinction. In French, the court ob-
served, "[w]e are not told what is so pernicious about refusing to
treat unmarried, cohabiting couples as if they were legally mar-
ried." 93 Similarly, the Smith court stated, "[w]e simply hold the
extension to unmarried couples of rights which inhere in the mar-
riage relationship is not a state interest of the highest order."'94
Neither court noted what "rights" allow only married couples to
live together, failing to recognize the distinction between civil
rights statutes and other areas of the law.
This misstatement of the central issue is precisely what makes
antidiscrimination statutes in public accommodations, education,
housing, and employment so important. While classifications such
as marital status may have some relevance in these other areas of
the law (so that the government may prevent fraud or support
marriage relationships), marital status has no bearing on a person's
188. One can imagine how difficult it would be to inquire into the length, sincerity, and
intimacy of a relationship. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283 ("The difficulty of discerning
whose bonds are genuine and whose are not may justify requiring official certification of
the bonds via a marriage document.").
189. Id.
190. Id. ('That problem is not present in housing cases; as this case demonstrates, if
anything, an unmarried couple who wish to live together are at a disadvantage if they
claim to be romantically involved.").
191. Beattie, supra note 85, at 1429.
192. Id. at 1444; see also Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909,
918 (Cal. 1996) ("One can recognize marriage as laudable, or even as favored, while still
extending protection against housing discrimination to persons who do not enjoy that
status.").
193. 460 N.W.2d at 10.
194. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 396 n.10
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
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civil rights of access to public accommodations, housing, and em-
ployment. That is precisely what is so invidious about discrimi-
nation in housing. These areas are distinctly different, and the
failure of courts to recognize this, results in the continuation of
stereotypes and moral judgments.' Additionally, by protecting
unmarried couples from discrimination, the state is not promoting
or discouraging either type of marital status; it is treating the two
equally.
It may be correct that the government does not have a compel-
ling interest in eradicating discrimination against unmarried couples
in all areas of the law; however, it does have a compelling interest
in eradicating discrimination against unmarried couples in housing,
employment, and other areas where distinctions based on marital
status would be invidious and stigmatizing.
2. Compelling Interest in Protecting Tenants' Privacy and
Intimate Association Interests
Although the issue was not raised in any of the housing cases,
the government may have a compelling interest in protecting the
privacy interests of the tenants. While the relationship between two
unmarried individuals has not been recognized as a constitutionally
protected privacy interest,' it does share many of the same qual-
ities as those intimate relationships that are so protected. Conse-
quently, the cohabitating unmarried individuals' relationship, at
least for heterosexuals, could rise to the level of a compelling
governmental interest based on existing case law.
The Supreme Court has recognized that certain intimate rela-
tionships and interests are so personal that they are protected by a
constitutional right of privacy or intimate association."9 General-
ly, however, these cases have been limited to family,' mar-
195. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing the stigma of discrimi-
nation suffered by unmarried couples); see also Beattie, supra note 85, at 1445 ("State
legislatures enacted human rights laws to prevent [employers, landlords, and owners of
public accommodations] from imposing arbitrary and sometimes moralistic policies on
individuals and to require those entities to base their decisions on merit and legitimate
business concerns.").
196. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
197. These are based in the First Amendment right of association and other "penum-
bras." See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (observing that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras").
198. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (recognizing
the right to cohabit with one's relatives); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (recognizing the privacy of the parent-child relationship); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
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riage,99 procreation,' contraception,"' and choices about
whether to beget a child or terminate a pregnancy. °"
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 3 the Court held that this right
would not extend to a homosexual couple engaging in sodomy.2
However, the Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether this
right would apply to unmarried heterosexual couples. 5 Although
some have argued that Bowers stands for the proposition that there
is no constitutional right to privacy in any consensual sexual rela-
tions between unmarried adults-heterosexual or homosexu-
al--there is significant evidence to suggest that the holding in
Bowers is limited to sexual relations between homosexuals. 7
ters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing parents' right to control education and
rearing of their children).
199. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (recognizing the right to
privacy with respect to marriage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The free-
dom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
200. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (regarding forced sterilization).
201. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
202. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
203. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
204. Id. at 190-91.
205. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17 ("We observe that the Court has not definitively
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state
statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults."); Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 191 (observing that Carey did not extend the right to privacy to all sexual conduct
between adults); Note, supra note 180, at 1663 ("Mhe Court has never addressed this
issue directly." (footnote omitted)).
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court refused to overturn a zoning law
prohibiting a group of students from living together. 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974). However,
the Belle Terre Court did not reach the issue of unmarried couples, as the zoning ordi-
nance allowed an unmarried couple to live together. Id. at 8.
206. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (upholding st te law
presumption that a child born to a woman living with her husband is the husband's child
over the constitutional challenge of the natural father). The Michael H. Court, like the
Bowers Court, relied heavily on historic practices and the presumption of legitimacy. Id.
at 123-27. There is an argument that by reading Bowers broadly along with Michael H.,
the Court will only protect "historically-based" relationships. But see Note, supra note
180, at 1666-67 & nn.49-53 (refuting that approach by observing that historical-based
arguments have only been used in due process cases, and noting that neither Bowers nor
Michael H. overruled Griswold and its progeny).
207. Fist, the Court's reasoning focuses solely on homosexuals. See Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 192-94 (discussing the historical treatment of homosexuals in the law); Note, supra
note 180, at 1666 n.48 ("Bowers' focus on ...homosexual conduct limits its impact on
settled privacy jurisprudence."). Additionally, the Court specifically distinguishes homosexu-
al sodomy because it is not procreative. 478 U.S. at 191 ("No connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated.").
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Moreover, the Court has recognized a constitutional right to priva-
cy regarding choices about contraception for unmarried individuals,
which was not overruled by Bowers.2
Even though the relationship between heterosexual cohabitants
has not been explicitly protected on constitutional grounds, it ex-
hibits the same qualities as those relationships that are constitution-
ally protected. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,"° the Court
defined the limits of the right to intimate association:
Between [the] poles [of selection of spouse and selection of
employees], of course, lies a broad range of human rela-
tionships that may make greater or lesser claims to consti-
tutional protection from particular incursions by the State.
Determining the limits of state authority over an
individual's freedom to enter into a particular association
therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where
that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of
personal attachments. . . . We note only that factors that
may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular
case may be pertinent.10
The relationship between a cohabiting unmarried couple clearly
shares many of the characteristics that would place it on the spec-
trum as one of the most intimate. The relationship is small and
highly selective. As cohabitation is often a precursor for or an
alternative to marriage, its purpose may be very similar to the
purposes of the marriage relationship.2 ' Thus, although the Court
has not expressly recognized this relationship as constitutionally
protected, it should have a claim to protection.
Moreover, courts have held that the state may have a compel-
ling interest in protecting the privacy interests of individuals."'
208. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis in original)); see also Note, supra note 180,
at 1665-68 (arguing that this, along with the cases recognizing the right to bear children,
logically leads to the conclusion that sexual relations between two unmarried heterosexual
partners must be constitutionally protected).
209. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
210. Id. at 620.
211. Contra Note, supra note 180, at 1666 n.45 (focusing on fornication).
212. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1344 (Colo. 1994) (observing that "preserving
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Additionally, for an interest to be compelling, there is no require-
ment that it reach the level of a constitutional right.2"3 In Evans
v. Romer, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the government
may have a compelling interest in protecting the right of
associational privacy, if the relationship resembled those defined by
Roberts."4 The relationship between an unmarried heterosexual
couple does meet the Roberts definition.215  Therefore, even
though the relationship between heterosexual cohabitants is not
constitutionally protected, the state does have a compelling interest
in protecting it.
3. Compelling Interest in Providing the Individual Tenants with
Housing
There is vast agreement that providing access to housing to
individuals is a compelling governmental interest."6 Housing is a
basic, fundamental need, and there is a clear national interest in
providing housing for all.
However, while many exemptions from the housing statute may
frustrate this interest, a few exemptions probably will not result in
much harm to the individual tenants. It may slightly inconvenience
them, but if they find alternative housing, the governmental interest
is still served.217 Moreover, for economic reasons, it is unlikely
that droves of landlords will seek religious exemption from
antidiscrimination laws.2"8 The only danger would be if scores of
landlords began seeking religious exemption from fair housing
laws, or if there is a shortage of rental housing or of rental hous-
ing in a certain price range.
Providing housing for all citizens is a compelling interest;
however, this interest will likely fail the least restrictive means
associational privacy may rise to the level of a compelling state interest"), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995); see also Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1350 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that state protection of privacy interests may be a justification for a statute re-
stricting free speech rights).
213. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
214. Evans, 882 P.2d at 1344-45.
215. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282 (Alaska
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 45 (1991), review granted and opinion superseded, 825
P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992).
217. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
218. See Smith, supra note 85, at 1058 (noting that over 2,764,000 unmarried couples
live together).
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aspect.219 Although an unmarried couple may be able to show
that they cannot find housing, this will require unusual circum-
stances in housing markets, and is unlikely to succeed.
4. Compelling State Interest in Regulating Secular Commercial
Activities
The government may have a more compelling interest in regu-
lating an individual's activities when they occur in the context of
commercial activities.220 This factor is very important in the case
of a landlord seeking a religious exemption from a fair housing
law. In United States v. Lee, the Court held that "every person
cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising
every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs," '221 especial-
ly when that burden occurs in voluntary commercial activity. '
Similarly, the Court has refused to grant religious exemptions in
other cases where religious organizations have been involved in
commercial activities."'
Essentially, this argument relates not only to the heightened
governmental interest in regulating commercial activities, but also
to the decrease in burden on a free exercise claimant who enters
into secular commercial activities. In other words, First Amendment
rights are not absolute, and a person may waive them, to some
extent, by entering the marketplace.224 For example, the court in
State by McClure v. Sports and Health Club noted that "Sports and
219. See infra part III.C.
220. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
221. Id.
222. Id. Specifically, the court stated, "[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as
a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes
which are binding on others in that activity." Id. (emphasis added).
223. E.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-05
(1985) (holding that the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the employees of
commercial businesses run by a religious organization is constitutional); Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983) (upholding application of antidiscrimination
laws to a church-run private school); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384 (1990) (holding that a generally applicable sales tax does
not constitutionally burden an organization's sale of religious materials).
224. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 294 ("'By entering the economic arena
and trafficking in the marketplace, the foundation has subjected itself to the standards
Congress has prescribed for the benefit of employees."' (quoting Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 722 F.2d 397, 400 (1984)); cf. Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-29 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that First
Amendment protections are waived in commercial transactions).
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Health, however, is not a religious corporation-it is a Minnesota
business corporation engaged in business for profit. By engaging in
this secular endeavor, appellants have passed over the line that
affords them absolute freedom to exercise religious beliefs."
'
Conversely, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court focused on how the
Amish religion dictated separation from society." In the cases
involving landlords seeking religious exemption from fair housing
statutes, the landlords did not enter the commercial real estate
market for religious purposes.' This is not to suggest that their
free exercise rights are waived completely, just that governmental
regulations are less burdensome, or more compelling, when they
occur in the commercial context.
This argument may sound completely contrary to everything the
Free Exercise Clause and RFRA stand for: making allowances for
religious liberty and diverse religious practices in a secular society.
The Court has granted religious exemptions in cases involving
commercial activities. For example, the Court's leading free exer-
cise case, Sherbert v. Verner, granted an exemption from an unem-
ployment compensation requirement for a worker who had a reli-
gious objection to Saturday work. 8 However, the housing cases
are distinguishable. In Sherbert, the claimant was asking for gov-
ernment unemployment benefits; she was not asking her former
employer to rehire her and accommodate her religious beliefs. In
the housing arena, the landlords are essentially expecting the ten-
ants, and society's general antidiscrimination ideal, to accommodate
their religious beliefs. In United States v. Lee, the Court stated,
"[g]ranting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer
operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employ-
ees." 9 Similarly, granting an exemption from a fair housing law
225. Sports and Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985).
[W]hen appellants entered into the economic arena and began trafficking in the
market place, they have subjected themselves to the standards the legislature
has prescribed not only for the benefit of prospective and existing employees,
but also for the benefit of the citizens of the state as a whole in an effort to
eliminate pernicious discrimination.
Id. (emphasis added).
226. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-28 (1972).
227. If they were, they could potentially fall under the religious organization exemptions
to fair housing laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1994) (allowing religious organizations to
discriminate by renting only to members of the same religion).
228. 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
229. 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
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imposes the landlord's religious faith on the tenants.
Therefore, the government's interest in regulating secular com-
mercial activities adds to the magnitude of its compelling interests
in eradicating marital status discrimination in housing, protecting
privacy interests, and providing housing. Moreover, the fact that
this religious objection takes place in commercial activity for profit
makes any burden on the landlord less onerous.23°
C. Least Restrictive Means
Even if the government does have a compelling interest that
justifies burdening a landlord's exercise of religion, it must still
show that "application of the burden to the person ...is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est." 1 In the case of discrimination statutes, however, there is no
less restrictive means of preventing arbitrary discrimination other
than applying the statutes equally to all persons.
If the only compelling governmental interest is in providing
housing for all individuals, married or unmarried, refusing to allow
one religious exemption from a fair housing act is probably not the
least restrictive means of accomplishing that goal. If the tenants
find housing from a landlord who cannot claim a religious exemp-
tion, the governmental interest is served."2  However, when one
considers the compelling interest of eradicating discrimination
against unmarried couples in housing, the answer is different. Case
law supports the argument that there is no least restrictive means
of accomplishing the goal of eliminating discrimination in public
accommodations, employment, education and housing. 3  The
230. As most fair housing acts exempt small, owner-occupied dwellings, a landlord who
lived in the same dwelling with the tenants (and is therefore arguably more burdened)
would be allowed to discriminate. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)
(1994) (exempting sale or rental of a single-family home, if the owner does not own
more than three single-family homes, and owner-occupied dwellings, if intended for no
more than four families).
231. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(2) (1994).
232. See supra part III.B.3. This is supported by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981), which allowed a free exercise exemption from the requirements of an unemploy-
ment compensation statute. Id. at 719 ("There is no evidence in the record to indicate
that the number of people who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between
benefits and religious beliefs is large enough to create 'widespread unemployment."').
233. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-29 (1984); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); State by McClure v. Sports and Health
Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); see
also Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 20
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McClure court observed that the state's interest in eradicating dis-
crimination would be frustrated by allowing an exemption. 4
Even more emphatic, the Roberts Court held that
acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of pub-
licly available goods, services, and other advantages cause
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to
prevent .... [L]ike violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct
from their communicative impact, such practices are enti-
tled to no constitutional protection."
All these courts indicate that even allowing limited discrimi-
nation is wrong. Similarly, in the marital status/fair housing cases,
there is no less restrictive means of the state's goal of eradicating
marital status discrimination in housing and promoting and protect-
ing civil rights. Once arbitrary discrimination is allowed, no matter
how few or how many times, the state's interest is being under-
mined.
IV. CONCLUSION
The claim of the landlord seeking a religious exemption from
state fair housing acts protecting unmarried cohabitants should not
be granted. Although Congress manifested its desire to protect
religious liberty and free exercise by passing RERA, evidence
shows that RFRA will probably not alter free exercise doctrine
other than overruling Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith. Additionally, as Supreme Court standards for
granting religious exemptions were narrowing before Smith, the
requirements for obtaining an exemption under RFRA will likely
be the same.
Thus, landlords seeking exemption from a state fair housing act
may have difficulty meeting even the initial burden requirement
under RFRA. Whether a landlord can make out a legally cogniza-
ble burden will depend on whether she objects- to just unmarried
cohabitation, or to the facilitation of that behavior. In any event,
any legal burden on the landlord who objects to the facilitation of
cohabitation is legally minimal, because the landlord herself is not
(Minn. 1990) ("Federal courts have also consistently refused to allow religious exemptions
from anti-discrimination statutes.").
234. McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 853.
235. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
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coerced into cohabiting; instead, she is merely objecting to
another's sin.
The state has several compelling interests that could override
this burden on the landlord's exercise of religion. First, it has a
compelling interest in eradicating marital status discrimination in
housing. Although marital status is not one of the more tradition-
ally protected groups, the compelling reasons for protecting groups
such as race and gender can be extended and applied to marital
status. Moreover, the fact that unmarried couples are treated differ-
ently in other areas of the law does not mean that the state's inter-
est in promoting their civil rights should be decreased. The state
may also have a compelling interest in protecting the privacy rights
of unmarried tenants, at least for heterosexuals. However, the com-
pelling governmental interest of providing housing is probably too
broad to apply to one landlord.
Finally, the fact that this issue arises in a commercial context
tilts the balance away from the landlord's free exercise interests,
toward governmental interests in regulation. Thus, even if religious
liberty is "emphatically mandated in RFRA," 6 landlords discrim-
inating against unmarried couples have crossed the line of constitu-
tionally protected conduct. They should be required to adhere to
fair housing statutes that govern the limits of discriminatory con-
duct.
REBECCA A. WISTNER
236. Swanner, 115 S. Ct. at 462 (Thomas, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari).
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